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Abstract: 
We have assembled a database of operational satellites in orbit as of 2004, and 
have developed a series of simple models to assess the economic impacts to 
this resource caused by various scenarios of superstorm events possible during 
the next sunspot cycle between 2010 and 2014. Despite the apparent robustness 
of our satellite assets against the kinds of storms we have encountered during 
the satellite era, our models suggest a potential economic loss exceeding $1 0’’ 
for satellite replacement and lost profitability caused by a ‘once a century’ single 
storm similar to the 1859 superstorm. From a combination of power system and 
attitude control system (the most vulnerable) failures, we estimate that 80 
satellites (LEO, MEO, GEO) may be disabled as a consequence of a superstorm 
event. Additional consequences may include the failure of many of the GPS, 
GLONASS and Galileo satellite systems in MEO. Approximately 98 LEO 
satellites that normally would not have re-entered for many decades, may 
prematurely de-orbit in ca 2021 as a result of the temporarily increased 
atmospheric drag caused by the superstorm event occurring in 2012. The $10” 
International Space Station may lose at least 15 kilometers of altitude, placing it 
in critical need for re-boosting by an amount that is potentially outside the range 
of typical Space Shuttle operations during the previous solar maximum in ca 
2000, and at a time when NASA plans to decommission the Space Shuttle. 
Several LEO satellites will unexpectedly be placed on orbits that enter the ISS 
zone of avoidance, requiring some action by ground personnel and ISS 
astronauts to avoid close encounters. Radiation effects on astronauts have also 
been considered and could include a range of possibilities from acute radiation 
sickness for astronauts inside spacecraft, to near-lethal doses during EVAs. The 
specifics depends very sensitively on the spectral hardness of the accompanying 
SPE event. Currently, the ability to forecast extreme particle events and coronal 
mass ejections, or predict their fluences and geo-severity in the 24-hrs prior to 
the event, appears to be no better than 50/50. 
If the events of the 1859 superstorm serve as a guide, the scope of a 
contemporary superstorm will most certainly be an awesome event, but one that 
the vast majority of our other satellite resources may reasonably be expected to 
survive. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20050210154 2019-08-29T20:43:40+00:00Z
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1 .O Introduction 
Satellites appeared to be remarkably robust against most space weather events 
encountered during the last 30 years, however, recent studies of historical events 
show that even more violent solar and geomagnetic storms are possible for 
which we have, as yet, not experienced during the space age. A recent study of 
historical solar storms by Cliver and Svalgaard [2005] compared more than 50 
major storms identified by their geomagnetic indices, Solar Proton Events 
(SPES), and Coronal Mass Ejection (CME) speed. One storm stands out as the 
most impressive of all, namely the August-September 1859 superstorm event 
described in considerable detail by the Editors of the American Journal of 
Science [1859; 18601 and by Loomis [1860, 18611 and more recently by 
Tsurufani [2003]. It is often called a ‘superstorm’ because of its remarkable 
strength (white-light solar flare and D,t e -1700 nT) and global impact. 
Meanwhile, studies of Apollo lunar rock samples by Reedy [I 9981 suggest that 
during the last few million years, occasional solar events of perhaps 3-fold 
greater strength than the 1859 storm may have occurred based on radioisotope 
upper limits. In the discussion to follow, we will consider this ‘upper-limit event‘ to 
be the worst-case superstorm for our analysis. 
Considerable attention has been paid to the many ways in which space weather 
can compromise satellite operations. For a general overview see Odenwald 
[2000; 20051. In addition, Baker [l986] and Allen and Wilkinson [1993] have 
assembled and analyzed satellite anomaly databases. Belov et a/. [1999] and 
Lucci et a/. [2005] have analyzed these, and other, anomaly databases in the 
context of various space weather drivers. By coupling the growing knowledge of 
historical extreme space weather events (e.g. ‘storms’) with the known 
mechanisms that lead to satellite anomalies, malfunctions and loss of service, it 
should now be possible to ask what economic impact a worst-case superstorm 
might have on our satellite resources. The answer to this question may suggest 
strategies for mitigating these potentially costly effects. 
This paper will define an approach to estimating the economic consequences of 
a space weather superstorm, and derive rough cost and service disruption 
estimates for several worst-case scenarios based on what we know, or suspect, 
about superstorm dynamics. Although many important factors are currently 
missing from this model, or unavailable in the public literature, the intent of this 
effort, nevertheless, is to go a step beyond the current informal estimations and 
provide a new framework for quantitatively assessing these impacts. This 
approach will also reveal areas of research that might make subsequent 
economic impact models more robust. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the scale of the satellite 
resource; Section 3 discusses the economic dimensions of the commercial 
satellite resource; Section 4 quantifies, so far as is possible, the likely space 
weather influences that can be expected to play a dominant role in satellite 
functioning following a worst-case superstorm event; Section 5 assesses the 
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consequences of these influences through a series of simple models; and in 
Section 6 we will draw conclusions based on these models by providing a 
possible scenario for a superstorm. 
2.0 The Satellite Database 
As a consequence of the monthly launches of new satellites, and the ongoing 
retirement of existing satellites, the number of operating satellites is constantly 
changing. Estimates found in the literature range from 300 operating satellites 
according to Todd [2004], to 700 according to Spoffs [2003]. The database that 
forms the basis for this paper’s impact modeling was assembled from over two 
dozen online resources (e.g. Sat-ND.com, Space-Track.org, LyngSat.com, The 
Satellite Encyclopedia, Encyclopedia Astronautica), along with over 200 press 
releases, corporate financial statements, and government reports. By inter- 
comparing these resources to remove redundancies and in some instances 
misspellings, we were able to uniquely identify a total of 3,873 satellites including 
both working and non-working systems as of December 2004. Of these, 1,621 
satellites had previously re-entered the atmosphere according to Space Track 
[2005], leaving 2,252 satellites still in orbit in the working and non-working 
categories. As a point of reference, in 2005 the US Space Command tally for the 
number of orbiting bodies identified as ‘payloads’ [Space Track, 20051 was 3,048 
not including re-entered satellites. This number is larger than our estimate of still- 
orbiting satellites (2,252) since the term ‘payload’ can mean a variety of different 
objects delivered into space including dummy masses. Many of the still-orbiting 
satellites include systems such as communication satellites that have been 
placed in graveyard orbits and are no longer in service. ‘Reports of detailed 
satellite retirements are difficult to obtain for the commercial satellite sector, and 
nearly impossible to obtain for military systems. For this reason, we have decided 
to eliminate systems that are substantially older than reasonable planned 
lifetimes for the particular satellite system. 
From the collection of 2,252 satellites we eliminated satellites that were more 
than twice the published lifetime of the satellite. This is a fair criterion to adopt 
since, for example, communication satellites are seldom used past their planned 
retirement age due to the advance of more profitable technology in newer 
satellite designs. For example, GLONAS satellites launched in 1995 with 
lifetimes less than 3 years were eliminated, as were the NOSS, Oko and Picosat 
satellite series for similar reasons. We also eliminated a variety of test satellites 
with planned 1-2 year lifetimes such as Miranda, Oderacs, and Strela. From this 
assumption, we estimate that 936 satellites are apparently still working as of 
December 31, 2004. The current tally is believed to be complete to about +/- 5%, 
with the operational status of military satellites being the largest source of the 
uncertainty. A complete catalog of these satellites has been developed by 
Odenwald [2005]. 
In Table 1, we summarize the tallies of satellites for each category and orbital 
location. LEO (Low Earth Orbit) satellites have orbital perigees below 2,000 km; 
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GEO (Geosynchronous) satellites are located at 35,768 km, and ME0 (Mid Earth 
Orbit) are found between 2,000 km and 35,768 km. Operating satellites above 
GEO orbit are not considered in this study. 
3.0 Satellites as an Economic Asset. 
There are two components to this calculation of economic value: 1) the actual 
satellite hardware and launch costs; and 2) the resource value returned by the 
satellite during its operational life. Both must be considered as elements of a 
replacement cost if the satellite is disabled. The first of these is by far the easiest 
to estimate, though there are some ambiguities in the definition of the term ‘cost’. 
When satellite costs are published, they often appear in one of at least three 
possible forms: 1) Satellite hardware cost alone; 2) hardware plus launch cost; or 
3) satellite ‘cost’ plus operations and insurance. Generally, little attempt is made 
in the literature to distinguish between these possibilities in a consistent way. The 
resulting ambiguities can, for example, cause a 30% variance in the quoted price 
of a GEO satellite. 
Of the 936 operating satellites, our database contains actual published costs for 
436 satellites collected from hundreds of web-based press releases and related 
sources. For satellites (specifically military systems) where such costs could not 
be uncovered, we estimated a cost based on published estimates for the 
particular satellite model (e.g. Galaxy, Iridium, GPS or bus type). If the satellite 
model could bot be determined, we assumed a cost based on the satellite’s mass 
and orbit*location. For example, from a survey of various satellite systems at 
LEO, M E 0  and GEO, the median price per kilogram for-a satellite is $70k at 
ME0 and-$l78k at GEO. LEO satellites are far more diverse in function and cost 
than other satellite because these systems include 1 kg nanosatellites as well as 
14,000 kg military surveillance satellites. For example, the LEO price per kg is 
$65k with Iridium and Globalstar satellites included, and $455k without Iridium 
and Globalstar included. The later cost is strongly biased in favor of large 
systems such as the Hubble Space Telescope and various DoD payloads. 
. 
The estimated replacement cost (satellite plus launch) for the entire working 
satellite population as of the end of 2004 is about $1.9 x lo’’, of which about 
$5.5 x lo9 appears to be launch cost. Given that only half of the satellites had 
published costs, and that the price variance for the unreported systems can be 
up to 30%, the total replacement cost is likely to range from $1.7 to 2.3 x 10”. 
Figure 1 shows that half of the existing satellite resource, representing an 
investment of about $1 O’”, is older than five years, and 181 satellites 
representing about $4.3 x 10” are at least 10 years old and in most cases due 
for retirement. 
Beyond the obvious national security importance of maintaining a large military 
satellite asset, the civilian satellite industry represents a major source of 
economic activity supported entirely by the 691 research, communications, 
imaging, and weather satellites currently in orbit. The satellite communications 
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industry by 2002 was already worth $8.68 x 10" annually [Space.com, 20031 and 
represents the largest element of the civilian economic sector that relies wholly 
on the availability of satellite resources. This leads to the conclusion that 
approximately $2.5 x 1 O8 of business per day derives directly from satellite- 
related services and profits. 
As for the second component to our asset calculation, we can assess the 
resource value generated by a satellite once we have determined which 
elements of the satellite generate the profit. For communications satellites, this 
usually depends upon the number of transponders in operation and their cost to 
lease. From Table 2 we see that the average transponder is leased at about $2 x 
1 06/year [ VSAT, 20051. 
From the known transponder information for 235 of the 308 operating GEO 
satellites, we estimate that by December 2004, the 235 satellites and their 6,841 
transponders have generated approximately $7.4 x 10" during their 36,700 
transponder-years of operation. Figure 1 shows the cumulative value of our 
existing GEO satellite assets, including both the replacement cost, and the profit 
generated by those s stems with transponders. By 2004, this population has 
generated about $10 in profits since launch, or approximately $10" annually by 
2004. Note that the cumulative replacement cost is equal to the cumulative profit 
for satellites currently older than 4 years. Younger systems have not had enough 
time to 'break even' since launch. 
x 
4.0 Modeling 
Despite the obvious importance of our satellite resources, so far as we could 
determine, there has not been a systematic and detailed attempt to determine 
the global economic losses to this system of satellites from space weather 
effects. There are many informal opinions about the consequences of such 
space weather impacts across the entire satellite resource, but no rigorous 
attempt to quantify these opinions, or base them on realistic models. A major 
impediment to creating such a detailed prediction is that the commercial satellite 
community does not publish details on the profitability or losses incurred by their 
satellites. Moreover, the impacts to satellite systems by space weather events of 
any kind are rigorously kept from the open literature due to the very real concern 
that such reports will impact investor/client confidence. Generally, the detailed 
manner by which a space weather event translates into a specific gain or loss in 
profit is a matter for conjecture. Nevertheless, there are a number of factors 
caused by space weather that are known to materially affect spacecraft 
operations, and these can be quantified. They are: solar power erosion, single 
event upsets and spacecraft anomalies, and orbit decay. These factors will be 
analyzed in the next three sections. 
4.1 Solar Power Erosion 
All satellites require solar-electric power to operate. Solar panel power is 
degraded by cosmic rays at a steady rate each year, and this effect is usually 
6 
built into the design of the solar panels. SPEs also cause solar panel degradation 
by significant amounts over times scales as short as a few hours. Because their 
magnitude (fluence) and onset are largely unpredictable, they represent a 
significant source of uncertainty in spacecraft solar panel design. 
The pre-launch lifetime estimate for a satellite is usually based on the - 2% per 
year decline in satellite operating power due to cosmic rays following the analysis 
of Chew [1991]. Satellites in ME0 orbits within the Van Allen Belts can, 
however, experience -5% power losses annually according to Pate/ [2000]. 
Typically, satellite lifetimes since 1995 are considered to be nearly 15 years, and 
satellites are commonly amortized on this basis. SPEs change this calculation by 
accelerating the erosion of the solar panels at a rate far faster than the planned- 
for cosmic ray component. Each year a satellite does not survive to its expected 
end-of-life (EOL) results in a significant loss in revenue. 
A list of SPEs and their fluxes between 1976 and 2004 was obtained from N O M  
[2004]. Table 3 summarizes this SPE history in terms of the peak fluxes of the 
strongest events each year, along with its date and associated flare. The SPE 
fluxes are integral 5-minute averages for protons with energies > I  0 MeV, given in 
particle flux units (pfuJ, measured by GOES spacecraft at geosynchronous orbit. 
(1 pfu = 1 proton cm- sr- s ). 1 -1 
The SPE flux history can be compared with the SOHO power degradation shown 
in Figure 2, adapted from Brekke [2004]. We have modeled the power loss by 
assuming a simple combination of cosmic ray and SPE effects according to: 
Power (%) = 100 -aT - (C/p) 
Where T is the number of 6-month intervals since launch and C is the cumulative 
sum of the peak SPE events in each half-year based on Table 3. In this analysis, 
C is, therefore, proportional to the total fluence of the strongest SPE events. The 
proportionality constant depends on the integrated flux from each SPE event, 
and its solid angle. For this approximation, we assume that the SPEs have 
comparable durations (typically -day) and effective solid angles at the 
spacecraft. 
The best fit to the SOHO data (Figure 2 dashed line) was obtained for 
a - 0.74 and f! - 16000. We note that this fit works best for the discrete ‘Peak 
events in Table 3 but is considerably worse for fits to the total fluxes each year. 
Apparently, there is a thresholding effect that favors only the strongest SPE 
events as the major causes of solar panel degradation. From the discrete event 
fit, we determine that, for the SOHO data, there is an annual cosmic ray decline 
of 1.5% and a conversion from SPE, pfu units to power loss of 16000 pfu per 
percent. Our simple model predicts that, as a consequence of the major SPE 
event on November 4, 2003, that the current SOHO power is at approximately 
81% by December 2004. 
7 
We assume that the power loss rate is roughly linear with the SPE flux over the 
range from 16,000 to 31,000 pfu, and that this linearity can be extended over the 
range from 3,000 to 100,000 pfu, corresponding to a range of power loss per 
event of 0.3% to 6%. This allows us to estimate the current operating levels of 
the 367 working GEO satellites launched after 1976. To do this, we have simply 
determined for each satellite the number of years since launch to 2005, and 
multiplied by the power erosion rate of 2% per year to determine the amount of 
expected degradation. Based on the documented history of SPE events and their 
fluences since 1976 we have added to each satellite’s cosmic ray power 
degradation, a contribution caused by known SPE events since launch. 
We note that the SOH0 fluxes are measured in interplanetary space, while the 
relevant GOES satellite fluxes at GEO should allow for partial shielding by 
Earth’s magnetic field. It is known that the hardness of the particle spectrum is 
affected by location in the magnetosphere, and that SPE particles with energies 
above 10 MeV are the most damaging to satellite electronics and solar panels 
[e.g. Lucci, 20051. GEO satellites are located at 6.6 Re where the spectral 
hardness change, compared to interplanetary space, is expected to be modest. 
In the models to follow, we will not attempt to correct for this affect at the present 
time. 
Including both the cosmic ray and SPE effects, our model summarized in Figure 
3 (lower curve) indicates that 26 of the 367 GEO satellites appear to be operating 
at below 50% of their beginning-of-life (BOL) power levels by 2005. There are 
few satellites older than 15 years in the current sample, and that as indicated in 
Table 4, there are no active Earth-orbiting research satellites or communications 
satellites older than 15 years. The preponderance of military systems among the 
oldest satellites may indicate a more robust satellite design, or simply that the 
actual state of functioning is poorly described in public documents. 
The sharp drop in the number of old GEO satellites operating at what we would 
estimate as 30% of their BOL power suggests that this is a threshold below 
which most categories of GEO satellites are retired, replaced or otherwise 
become unusable. 
An aggregate revenue loss due to SPEs can be estimated by using our average 
transponder base rate of about $2 x lo6 per year. This rate, when multiplied by 
the number of transponders on the satellite, and the years lost to SPEs, yields 
the satellite’s lost income. We will also consider only satellites launched after 
1990 that would be retiring in 2005, which corresponds to the canonical 15-year 
EOL horizon. If only the cosmic ray rate is responsible for satellite EOL, it will be 
assumed there is no loss of revenue since this factor was considered in the 
lifetime estimate and the satellite owner’s profitability calculation. However, SPEs 
will advance the retirement date by an amount equal to their equivalent number 
of cosmic-ray years. For example, the SPE of July 14, 2000 presumably caused 
a 2% power loss for all satellites operating on that date. This equals a full year of 
lifetime loss at the expected 2% per year cosmic ray rate. For 20 transponders 
operating at $2 x 106/year this results in a $4 x I O 7  loss of potential revenue if the 
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satellite is decommissioned after 14 years because of SPE events, rather than 
the baseline 15 years of normal operation based on cosmic ray degradation only. 
We have calculated the revenue of the commercial GEO satellites through 2004 
by subtracting the number of years lost due to cosmic rays and SPEs from the 
age of the satellite by the end of 2004. We multiply this difference by the number 
of transponders in each satellite, and by the transponder leasing price of $2 x 
1 06/year. According to our database of working commercial GEO satellites, the 
78 satellites (containin 1,860 transponders) launched in 1996 or earlier have a 
net revenue of $6 x 10 . They continue to operate well past their expected EOLs, 
which averages about 12 years. The satellite that generated the most revenue is 
Intelsat-701 launched in 1993. By 2004 it has been operational for 11 years. 
During this time it has experienced about 7.8 years of lost operation due to SPEs 
and cosmic rays. Its 36 transponders have generated $2.34 x 1 O8 in revenue, 
and the satellite still has four years to go for its scheduled 15-year EOL. The 
additional 157 commercial satellites launched between 1997-2004 (inclusive) 
with an estimated 4,980 transponders have already experienced a loss of $1.3 x 
10” from SPEs. However, the oldest of these satellites is only 7 years old. The 
average planned lifetimes are 15 years, which means that they are only half way 
through their expected operating lives. What affect will SPE and cosmic ray 
degradation have on this population just before sunspot maximum in ca 2012? 
By 2012, the cumulative age distribution of the satellites launched before 2005 
shown in Figure 4 (upper curve) will include more than 160 satellites older than 
15 years. If we assume a distribution of SPEs similar to what was experienced 
between 1993-2004, we can predict that by 201 1, about 31 0 satellites of the 
existing 367 GEO satellites will be operating at less than 60% BOL power 
according to Figure 3 (upper curve), and 60 satellites will be operating below the 
imminent-replacement threshold of 30% BOL power. To offset this normal rate of 
satellite aging, approximately 160 replacement satellites will need to be launched 
between 2005-2012, which corresponds to an annual launch rate of about 22 
satellites. This is similar to the forecasted launch rates between 2004-201 0 
estimated by COMSTAC [2004], suggesting that our baseline satellite model 
(sans a superstorm event) is consistent with current market forecasts for the 
commercial GEO satellite sector. 
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4.2 Single Event Upsets 
Previous space weather events have also produced a wide array of on-orbit 
‘anomalies’, although there seems to be no coherent model to explain why some 
satellites are affected while others of similar design are apparently not. For 
example, on January 1 1 , 1997 the Telstar 401 communication satellite was 
disabled by a space weather event. This satellite uses the Lockheed Martin AS- 
7000 bus, which is also used on AsiaSat II, EchoStar 111 and Telstar 402. One 
reason might be orbital location at the time of the event. Satellites at midnight 
local time are more vulnerable than at other local times since the electrons reach 
GEO from the magnetospheric tail. Some of these events are caused by SPEs, 
while others are caused by energetic electrons >1 MeV, which have been 
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referred to as ‘killer’ electrons by Baker [I 9971. In either situation, these particles 
penetrate deep into the spacecraft and cause SEUs or other logic errors that can 
lead to corrupted data and phantom commands. They can also cause satellite 
charging where energetic electrons differentially charge various parts of satellite 
surfaces. When discharges occur between different surfaces, currents are 
induced in satellite wiring, sometimes causing problems. The most common is 
attitude control system problems due to signals induced on attitude sensor 
wiring. 
Lucci et al. [2005] and Mountford and Sastty [2000] have done extensive studies 
of satellite anomalies. The former study involved anomaly data for 220 satellites 
between 1971 and 1994. The second study used the twelve SKYNET satellites 
and electrostatic discharge data between 1990-2001 correlated with Kp index 
and its first derivative, as a measure of environmental factors. 
Assessing the impact to this resource from a superstorm requires us to show that 
such storms are qualitatively very different in scope from the storms we have 
already encountered since the start of the space age. If a superstorm is only 
incrementally different than the storms we have already experienced, it is unlikely 
that the impact to satellites will be anything more than incremental as well. Of 
course, we can not discount the possibility that the impacts may enter a non- 
linear regime so that a factor-of-two increase beyond recent storm levels we 
have experienced will generate more than a factor of two increase in satellite 
problems. There is reason to expect that such non-linearities between fluence 
and SEU frequency may be important. For instance, the number of secondary 
particles generated by SPES depends on the satellite shielding - essentially the 
satellite’s mass [Panasyuk, 20011. One may expect that heavier satellites have a 
larger ’non-linear’ problem with SEUs produced by secondary particles, than 
lower-mass satellites. Also, according to models by Belov et al. [2004] the 
relationship between proton flux and satellite anomalies is a power law, rather 
than a linear relationship. 
4.3 Orbit Decay 
Satellite orbit decay is a complicated function of the mass-to-surface-area cross- 
section in the direction of travel ratio of a satellite, and the atmospheric density 
profile,- quantities that are not easily determinable for each of our database 
members. Increased solar UV increases the heating of the atmosphere and 
increases its density. Figure 5 shows the impact that changes in atmospheric 
solar heating have had on the frequency of satellite re-entries since 1967, based 
on data from Space Track [2005]. A clear correlation is evident in which the 
largest numbers of re-entries occur during the peak years of sunspot cycles in 
1968, 1979, 1989 and 2000. 
Although the time scale for these solar cycle variations is on the order of several 
months, individual space weather events lasting less than a day also take their 
toll on satellite perigees. This can be seen in the altitude log of the International 
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Space Station during the Bastille Day, 2001 storm as described by Harnrnons 
[2001] and shown in Figure 9. 
5.0 Historic Superstorms 
The study of space weather superstorms has increased over the last few years, 
primarily because we have not encountered such an event since our satellite 
network reached its current level of sophistication. Despite considerable recent 
speculation, it is not known how extensive the impact from an actual superstorm 
might be. Informal opinions seem to run the gamut from ‘all satellites lost’ to 
‘minimal impact’. 
The study of the record of historic SPE events during the last 500 years by 
McCracken ef a/. [2001 a, b] reveals over 125 such events that have left their 
traces in the nitrite abundances of polar ice cores from Antarctica, Greenland and 
the Arctic Region. The strongest of these coincided with the 1859 Carrington- 
Hodgson storm and white-light flare. A historical study by Chef and Svalgaard 
[2004] of the major storms since 1859 reveals a rather broad ranking of these 
events across the many physical parameters that characterize these events. 
Table 5 shows the four historical storms that achieved the most extreme values 
for the indicated parameters: CME speed, SPE proton flux, Dst, Sudden 
ionospheric Disturbance (SID) recorded on a magnetogram, minimum magnetic 
latitude and flare luminosity. Of these, the Carrington-Hodgson 1859 storm 
appears as the most extreme event in nearly all categories. 
The 1859 Carrington-Hodgson superstorm produced the largest SPE from the ice 
core record with an equivalent fluence of 18 .8~ 1O9 particles/cm*. Similar results 
have been reported by Townsend et a/. [2003,2004] and have led to predictions 
of severe astronaut radiation exposures leading to acute sickness even within 
well-shielded spacecraft (Shuttle). The July 14, 2000 Bastille Day SPE had a 
fluence of 6 . 3 ~  I O 9  particles/cm2 for protons with E> 30 MeV, and was observed 
to cause a 2% power decline in the SOHO satellite. This translates into a 
Carrington-Hodgson equivalent power loss scaled from the SOHO data of 
(18.8/6.3)~2% = 6%. Is this the worst-case? 
McCracken ef a/. [2001] have identified the solar activity cycles during the 
satellite era as being uncharacteristically weak in SPE events and fluences 
compared to the historical record of these events since the year 1567. The 
frequency of large events with > 30 MeV fluences > 2 x 10 particles /cm2 
between 1964-1 996 averages one event per sunspot cycle, while 6 - 8 such 
events occurred for sunspot cycles near the years 1605 and 1893. The 
integrated fluence of the largest five SPEs between 1830-1 91 0 was 54.9 x 1 O9 
particles/cm2 compared with only 6 . 7 ~  IO9 particles/cm2 during the years 191 0 to 
1985. In particular, the satellite era (1967-1994) ranks sixth lowest in the 
integrated fluences of the strongest 6-8 SPEs. The implication is that, during the 
last 400 years, the sun is most certainly capable of producing a substantially 
more active satellite environment than what we have come to accept in recent 
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decades. Depending on the assumptions made about the spectral hardness of 
the Carrington-Hodgson event, the fluence for >30 MeV protons may have 
reached levels near 36x l o 9  particledcm ; a factor of two greater than assumed 
in the above discussion for power loss (i.e. 12%). 
Reedy [ 19981 examined isotopic abundances in lunar rock surface layers to 
estimate the SPE fluence distributions for the last few million years. Apparently, 
the upper limits suggest that there have been no flares with fluences more than 
resulted from 10-times the average of flares seen during the last few decades. 
The 1859 flare is only 3-times more luminous than flares seen in recent decades. 
This suggests that the distribution of SPE fluences has a sharp turnover at levels 
just above the 1859-level. We can then assume that a storm more than 3 times 
as intense as the 1859 event is a reasonable upper limit ‘worst case’ event. This 
means the brightest SPE may have a flux of about (18.8 x 3)= 56x lo9  
particles/cm2, resulting in a power reduction of 18%. Once again, these events 
averaged over several million years are substantially less common than the 1859 
event. Nevertheless, they represent an upper limit on the true worst case 
superstorm event, and so we will use this flux, and the corresponding 18% power 
decline that results, as an upper bound to what we could reasonably expect from 
a single event. 
2 
At what time during a solar activity cycle might we expect such major storms to 
occur? Table 6 shows the years for the 10 largest SPES recorded since 1976 
compared to the year of sunspot maximum. Although the sample of large SPE 
events is statistically small, apparently, the largest storms occur within 2 years 
after sunspot maximum, with no major storms occurring in the two years prior to 
sunspot maximum. In the models to follow, we will consider the worst-case 
scenario for a superstorm, precipitating an 18% decline in solar panel power, 
occurs at the time of sunspot maximum in the year 2012. 
5.1 GEO satellite systems 
5.1.1 Solar Panel Degradation 
Previously in Section 4.1 , we used our satellite database, together with the 
estimated power degradation from the historical SPE events since 1976, and 
cosmic ray degradation, to determine the current 2005 solar power operating 
levels. The most recent satellite launches in this database occurred in 2004, so in 
the discussions to follow, we extended our satellite operational model to 20 years 
beyond this last launch year. This represents the far-horizon on anticipated 
satellite retirements from the current fleet based on industry expectations for 
satellite systems built in the early 2000’s. 
Model 1 - Prior to the superstorm in the year 2012, our baseline model described 
in Section 4.1 suggests 60 satellites would normally be operating below the 30% 
threshold. The addition of the superstorm in 2012 brings the total to 152 satellites 
that would fall below the 30% limit after the event, and requiring immediate 
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replacement. The superstorm causes a prompt loss of 92 additional satellites 
below the 30% threshold for 2012. What is more interesting, however, is the 
future run-out of this event through the year 2024. 
If we assume a distribution of SPES similar to the 12-year period from 1992 to 
2004, the baseline model suggests that 280 of the 367 satellites would require 
replacement under normal SPE and cosmic ray conditions. With the superstorm, 
all of the 367 satellites require replacement. This means (367 - 280 =) 87 
satellites launched after ca 2002 were affected by the superstorm and had to be 
prematurely retired at power levels below 30%. The replacement cost for these 
87 satellites is $2.4 x 10”. 
Comparing the predicted retirement years for the satellites before and after the 
storm, we estimate 1,575 years of lost service for this affected population. The 
total number of lost transponder-years is -22,000 resulting in $4.4 x l o lo  in lost 
services. This service revenue loss would be in addition to the $2.4 x 10” 
replacement cost for the additional 87 satellites affected through 2024, implying a 
total hardware plus service revenue loss of about $6.8 x I O ”  through 2024 as a 
direct result of the superstorm. 
A shortcoming of this model is that it does not include satellite launches after 
2005. A portion of these future launches are slated to increase the capacity of the 
GEO satellite network to maximize service and profits. However, a second goal is 
to replace satellites to make room for newer-generation models with increased 
sophistication and capacity. We will now investigate the effect a superstorm has 
when satellites are replaced on a fixed 15-year schedule, which is the typical 
timescale quoted by industrial records for satellites launched since 1995. 
Model 2 - This is similar to Model 1 except that we first replace all of the 
communication satellites older than the canonical 15 year limit after 2004. We do 
this by simply adding 15 years to the launch year of each satellite prior to 2005 to 
determine the replacement year, and then re-set the solar power levels of the 
new satellite to 100% as the satellite’s replacement is put into service. This 
results in no net growth to the GEO population between 2005-2024. As a 
consequence, by 2024 the 367 GEO satellites would have experienced 100% 
replacement, and the new suite of satellites would range from 50% to 100% 
operating solar power, with satellites launched before1 990 being replaced twice. 
For example, lntelsat 604 was launched in 1990. It would be replaced in 2005 
with a new satellite, and that satellite would in turn be replaced in 2020. 
Satellites operating through the modeled storm year 2012 would be replaced ‘just 
in time’ by the time their power levels reach about 40% so that no actual loss of 
service would occur. Satellites that would be replaced after the storm years 
would be unaffected. For this reason, we estimate that a worst-case superstorm 
near sunspot maximum would have little affect on satellite economic profitability 
so long as this 15-year replacement schedule is strictly adhered to. However, 
Figure 6 shows that this replacement rate would be relatively expensive to 
implement because it would involve in some years far more satellite launches 
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than we have experienced in previous years. This is especially true in ca 2015 
and 201 9 when we estimate -40 satellites will need replacement. The sudden 
decline after 2020 is due to the retirement of satellites launched after 2005 and is 
outside the scope of this paper. 
Comparing these two models, the estimated losses from a superstorm when no 
GEO satellite replacement occurs would be about $6.9 x I O "  in lost satellites 
and transponder revenue in the years following the event through 2024. The 
superstorm also would result in the premature replacement of about 140 
satellites before their planned dates. Approximately 30 to 40 satellites would be 
operating below the 30% power level immediately following the superstorm. At 
the time of replacement, and following a superstorm event in 2012, the oldest 
satellites are operating at about 40% of their initial power, which is above the 
threshold described in Section 4.1. It appears that, when satellites are replaced 
according to a fixed 15-year schedule, the economic impacts of the superstorm 
are largely mitigated so far as solar panel degradation is concerned. 
5.1.2 Killer Electrons and Satellite Anomalies 
In addition to solar panel degradation, GEO satellites are often victims of 
energetic particle showers (e.g. killer electrons) that lead to a variety of electrical 
systems and commanding disruptions by SEUs. This phenomenon has been 
exhaustively studied from the engineering standpoint, but also from case studies 
of known space weather events and their satellite impacts by Baker [ I  9971. 
Belov ef a/. [2004] have studied the statistics for 6000 anomalies occurring 
among 300 satellites in various orbital regions, and found no correlation between 
MeV proton fluences and anomalies for satellites in LEO. However, they found 
increasing correlations for MEO-type satellite orbits, and the highest correlations 
for GEO orbits. The distribution of anomalies between 1972 and 1994 had 
occasional peaks of 0.10 and 0.13 anomalies per day per spacecraft. From this, 
they were able to construct models predicting the number of anomalies for each 
satellite population as a function of proton and electron fluxes. For GEO satellites 
they obtained: 
F (1 0 anomalies/day/satellite) = -54 + 1.4~10 x E2 +0.83 AD +0.19 V - -4 -9 1.2 
0.35 
0.15 BZ + 1.1 PIOO + 1.6 P62'75 + 20 Sf+ 1.5 dalO 
2 
Where E2 is the>2MeV electron fluence in units of electrons/day/cm /str 
averaged over the past 3 days from GOES; Ap is in units of nT averaged over the 
previous 4 days; BZ is the northward component of the interplanetary magnetic 
field in nT averaged over the previous 2 days; V = solar wind speed in km/sec 
averaged over the previous 2 days; Pi00 is the fluence of > 100 MeV protons in 
protons/day/cm /str from GOES; P6o is the daily averaged GOES proton flux 2 
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above 60 MeV in protons/cm /sec/str; Sf is the seasonal factor (1 at the 
solstices, 3 at the equinoxes), and dalO is in units of % and measures the 
cosmic ray intensity [e.g. Belov, 19991. 
From the NOAA [2005] archive for the GOES satellite, the October 29, 2003 SPE 
a 2 6 
resulted in P(E > 10 MeV) = 7.7 x 10 protonslcm /day/str and Pi00 = 5.2 x 10 
protons/day/cm /str and E2 = 1.9 x 10 electrons/cm2/day/str. The estimated 
P6o would be -10 protonslcm /day/str or for an hour-long maximum phase, 
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-30,000 protons/cm /sec/str. This yields about 0.5 anomalies per satellite per 
day. 
For the superstorm SPE with a one-hour duration of its main phase, producing a 
fluence of 56x 10 particledcm over 4n steradians, we estimate P6o - 10 
protons/cm /sec/str. We also assume a spectrum similar to the October 29, 2003 
event for which Pi00 - E2 - O.OlP60 so that Pi00 = E2 = 10 
parlicles/cm /day/str. Plausible ranges for the quantities, V(km/s)= (2500, 3500), 
BZ(nT)= (-100, -200), Ap(nT)= (10, loo), Sf=3 at the equinox, and DalO(%)= 
(20, loo), yield contributions to the total anomaly rate which are of the order 
0.005 anomalies/day/satellite for their maximal values, compared to the much 
larger contributions by the fluence terms, E2, P60 and Pqoo, during a superstorm 
event. With these assumptions, the estimated anomaly rate F -10 
anomalies/day/satellite. The model suggests that a superstorm event could 
produce an anomaly rate -50-100 times higher than seen in the 1972-1994 
historical satellite anomaly records thus far. 
The relationship between anomalies and SEUs is not given in the analysis by 
Belov et a/. [2004], so one might conclude that SEU rates could actually be much 
higher than the ‘malfunction’ rates cited by Belov et a/. [2004]. There is some 
evidence for this elsewhere. For example, according to Brekke [2004], during the 
July 14, 2000 SPE event, the SOH0 satellite’s 2 gigabyte memory encountered 
76 SEUs per minute or an equivalent of 109,000 SEUs per day. The flux of that 
event was 24,000 particledcm /sec. By extrapolation, the 1859 superstorm with 
a flux three times greater could have nearly 228 SEUs per minute or 328,000 per 
satellite day. Only some of these might generate an actual satellite anomaly 
event. The SEU production of, for example, 100 additional false-stars in a CCD 
image used by the attitude control system (ACS) might yield only one actual 
anomaly of a satellite mispointing. The ASCA satellite was lost due to ACS 
anomalies caused by SEUs according to Space News 120021. However, the issue 
for satellite operators is, what will the managing of satellite operations be like 
when the SEU event rates become thousands of times higher than conditions 
they have witnessed thus far in anomaly management? 
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If we scaled our operating fleet of 936 satellites to Belov’s normal satellite 
anomaly rates, we might expect to experience about (0.1 3/satellite/day x 936 
satellites) -120 anomalies per day across the entire existing fleet of satellites. 
During the superstorm, the worst-case fluences suggest anomaly rates at least 
50 times higher (several per day per satellite). At rates of about (120 x 50 = ) 
6000 anomalies per day for an entire fleet of satellites, is it likely that the 
conditions for unrecoverable anomalies can be met? A study by Robertson and 
Stoneking [2003] of the specific systems affected by mission-critical, anomalies 
shows some troubling trends. 
Between 1990 and 2001 , 128 mission-critical anomalies were identified in the 
survey during the design life (not the extended life) of 764 satellites. Scaling this 
study by the number of satellite anomalies investigated by Belov (e.g. 6,000) 
among 300 satellites during 1971-1994 (23 years) we might expect (11/23 x 
6000) = 2,900 anomalies during the 1990-2001 period, of which 128 or 4% are 
mission-critical. Translating this to the estimated superstorm anomaly rate for the 
entire 936-satellite constellation of 6,000 per day, we estimate that there might 
be of the order of 240 mission-critical anomalies brought on by a superstorm. 
The most intense phase of SPE events generally last only a few hours, so this 
clearly suggests that satellite failure mitigation by ground controllers will be a 
challenging battle. 
The most common mission-critical, anomalies (40%)- involve the ACS 
(specifically the momentum wheel), and the electrical power system (solar panels 
and batteries)-which Robertson and Sfoneking [2003] identify as resulting in 13 of 
the 43 totalsatellite losses (30%) among 10 possible categories. Assuming that 
the 128 anomalies were distributed randomly across the sample of 764 satellites 
during- tM 1990-2001 period, most of the mission-critical, superstorm anomalies 
would also mvolve ACS and EPS systems, and we might expect of the order of 
(43/128 x 240) = 80 satellite failures from this one event, of which 30% would 
involve ACS and EPS failures. 
5.2 ME0 Satellites 
The 132 working ME0 satellites include the US Global Positioning System and 
the Russian GLobal Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), which collectively 
constitute over 58 satellites, in addition to 49 additional military communications 
and research satellites. The GPS system is, by far, the most critical of these 
ME0 systems. As a result of the de-classification of this technology and its rapid 
integration into a growing suite of civilian consumer items, it is estimated that 
there are 100 times more civilian users of GPS data than military consumers, and 
this market is rapidly expanding. By 2008 it is anticipated that revenues from 
GPS technology and consumer goods will exceed $2.2 x with over 8 x l o6  
vehicles equipped with GPS systems worldwide [GPS World, 20041. In 2008, a 
European satellite network called Galileo is scheduled to join GPS and 
GLONASS as a new civilian global positioning system. 
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The completed GPS constellation has 24 spacecraft in 6 high-altitude orbit 
planes in addition to 5 spares, each with a 7.5 year lifespan for Block IIA 
satellites launched from 1990 to 1996. By 2005, all of these satellites are older 
than their planned lifetimes. Many of the 19, Block 2A satellites launched 
between 1990 and 1996 are still operational at ages of 12-1 4 years. The 13 
Block IIR satellites launched between 1997 and 2004 are only now reaching their 
estimated EOLs, though they are expected to exceed this by a large margin as 
for Block IIA. Up to 12 Block IIR replacement satellites (called Block IIRM) were 
to be modified to use the new military M-code and are to be launched between 
2005 and 2006, with initial operational capability by 2008 and full capability by 
201 0 [GIobal Defense, 20011. Improvements in the Block IIF over previous 
satellites include a design life of 12.7 years and a dramatic increase in the growth 
for additional payloads and missions [GPS Fact Sheet, 20001. The first of an 
estimated 12 Block IIF launches will start in 2007 [Guenfhers Space Page, 20051. 
Because age seems more verifiable in military satellite operations than predicted 
power level or the satellite’s response to power erosion, we will examine the age 
distributions of the US GPS satellites and assume a replacement of services (by 
backup spare or new satellite) happens after 15 years. We also assume from the 
18% power degradation estimate for a superstorm, that a satellite would age 18/5 - 4 years. This rate is lower than for communications satellites because the GPS 
satellites survive for nearly as long as GEO communications satellites even 
though the solar power decline rates in ME0 are 5% per year according to Patel 
[2000], rather than 2% for GEO satellites according to Cheffy [1991]. 
Model 3 - The model begins in 2004 when 11 of the 29 GPS satellites are 
already past their nominal 8-year lifetimes. The older models are being replaced 
at the rate of 3 per year (ca 2003 and 2004), so by 2008 the entire Block IIA will 
be replaced by 12 newer models - the Block IIRMs. GLONASS, meanwhile, has 
10 operational satellites in 2005 with a goal of restoring the full 24 by 2007. The 
European Galileo GPS system will have 30 operational satellites by 2008. 
By the time of an assumed superstorm in 2012, all 12 of the Block II-RM 
satellites would reach or exceed their 12-year replacement lifetime. The number 
of operating satellites will probably be lower than the 24 needed to maintain a 
fully operational GPS system, spanning all geographic locations, and available at 
all times at the designed accuracy. The GPS constellation will consist of satellites 
operating well beyond their predicted replacement lifetimes following the 
Superstorm. Without replacements, it seems unlikely that the constellation would 
be able to provide the minimum of four satellites for ground-level GPS positioning 
at the designed accuracy, especially for military and aviation applications. 
The relatively youthful Galileo system also would fare rather poorly for launches 
between 2006-2008. Galileo satellite ages in 2012 would be between 4-6 years. 
Following the superstorm, this would rise to 8-1 0 years which is near the planned 
life expectancy for this system. The new GLONASS satellites launched between 
17 
2005-2007, with their intrinsically short lifespans of about 7 years would most 
likely be eliminated from operational status by a superstorm in 2012. 
In addition to the premature retirement of some of the GPS satellites, and 
possibly the failure of the system to operate with a full satellite compliment, the 
accuracy of the GPS system would be impaired regardless of whether satellites 
are lost or not. 
Differential GPS (DGPS) measurements available to the more expensive ground- 
based navigation systems (military, marine, air navigation) are less sensitive to 
ionosphere disturbances, however they are not completely immune from large 
gradients in ionospheric total electron content (TEC) according to studies by 
Skone et a/. [2004]. During the October 2003 storm, the DGPS errors reached 20 
meters, compared to quiet-time conditions of only 1-2 meters. [GPSwodd, 20041. 
During the Bastille Day-2001 storm, horizontal position errors of 20 to 40 meters 
were recorded for several hours using DGPS [Skone et a/., 20041. These position 
errors exceed the 5-1 0 meter limits for maritime navigation, and greatly exceed 
the 2-5 meter position errors for aviation and military applications. 
During the superstorm, severe ionospheric and geomagnetic disturbances could 
be expected to prevail for 24-72 hours based on the durations of historical 
storms, causing GPS users to have severely degraded positions for extended 
periods of time. The magnitude and duration of such a storm would, doubtless, 
have large practical impacts to airlines, military, and rescue services worldwide. 
There will also be 10s of 1 O6 of automobiles and other civilian position-finding 
systems in place by 2010 for which 50 to 1 OO-meter errors will render city driving 
by GPS useless, or even hazardous. 
5.3 LEO satellites 
5.3.1 Orbital Decay 
As of 2004, there are 437 satellites in LEO that appear to be still in operation. 
These satellites are primarily communication systems (e.g. Iridium, Globalstar), 
Earth resource mapping (e.g. Landsat-7), and imaging systems (e.g. Spot-5) that 
require LEO for the best mission outcomes. Many astronomical research 
satellites and manned platforms (e.g. Hubble Space Telescope and ISS) are in 
LEO. Figure 7 shows the population distribution with perigees less than 1400 km. 
The large change near 600 km represents the members of the Iridium satellite 
constellation. Although LEO satellites are considerably less vulnerable to SPE 
and solar panel degradation, their largest risks come from atmospheric friction 
and orbit decay. These conditions are known to change markedly during the 
solar cycle. 
Although the detailed re-entry behavior of LEO satellites depends on their 
individual aerodynamic properties, calculations of orbit decay times for 
reasonable satellite geometries and masses suggests that at altitudes of 300 km, 
decay times under normal atmospheric conditions, and without preventive 
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measures, are of the order of a week. At 150 km, the de-orbit time is a day or 
less. Satellites below 300 km appear to be at highest jeopardy, especially those 
with perigees near 100 km. Some satellites are able to re-boost themselves, 
however it is not known which specific systems have this capability, or how much 
propellant remains at the present time to carry out this function beyond 2005. 
Let's consider three cases of satellites that are not re-boosted: 
Hubble Soace Telescooe. According to the HST Status Report [SpaceRef, 20031, 
the worst case scenario has no re-boosting after 2003, and a moderate solar 
cycle peaking in 2012. The 1 1,000-kg, HST begins in 2003.5 with an orbit altitude 
of about 575 km, which remains largely unchanged until 2009.5, then begins a 
rapid decrease to 500 km in 201 1.5,450 km by 2012.5 and then reenters at 200 
km by 2016.0. Total remaining time in orbit since 2003 at an initial altitude of 575 
km is about 12.5 years. 
Starshine. According to Science@NASA [2001], this 80-kg satellite began with 
an initial orbit perigee after sunspot maximum (Starshine-3), of 475 km in 2001 
and re-entered in 2003. 
SNOE. Launched in February 1998 into an orbit with a 580 km perigee, this 115- 
kg satellite reentered in January 2004. 
ASCA. This 417-kg satellite was launched in 1993 into an orbit with an initial 
perigee of 570 km, and reentered in 2001. 
Model 4 - A simple model for orbit decay was created and applied to the LEO 
satellites, based on the formula: 
P(t) = Po - A ta 
where, Po is the initial orbit perigee, and A and a are constants that have been 
fitted to representative orbit decay plots for a small selection of satellites between 
400 to 600 km. Satellites above 600 km are assumed to have orbit lifetimes 
longer than 25 years, even during solar maximum conditions, with only modest 
perigee changes of 1 km/yr. Below 600 km, our simple function, P(t), is assumed 
to take affect until altitudes of 300 km are reached, at which point un-boosted 
satellites have only a few weeks of remaining lifetime. 
The fitting constants are shown in Table 7 for solar maximum and solar minimum 
conditions. A representative fit for the SNOE de-orbit is shown in Figure 7 
(dashed line). Although the range in mass for the satellites is a factor of 7000, the 
fitting coefficients fall in a very narrow range, with mean values of A = 0.6 +/- 0.3 
and a = 0.4 +/- 0.2 during solar minimum and A = 1.3 +/- 0.2 and a = 0.4 +/- 0.2 
during solar maximum. Although the value of the constant A depends on solar 
cycle phase, the power-law index shows little solar cycle variation. 
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We have fitted a simple sinusoid with a period of 11 years to the constant A to 
determine an analytic formula for the solar cycle contribution, and obtained the 
following form: 
A(t) = 0.9 + 0.6~0~(0.57(t-t0)) 
where 
is therefore: 
is the sunspot minimum year 1996. The best-fit satellite decay function 
With this albeit simple analytic decay formula, which does not allow for cycle-to- 
cycle variations in solar activity, we have determined the perigee evolution of the 
437 LEO satellites below 600 km at launch, and through the year 2024. In order 
to establish the population baseline for this model we do not include the effect of 
a superstorm in 2012. 
We were able to obtain the launch dates and initial perigees for 422 satellites, of 
which 393 have apparently survived to 2004. The distribution of these satellites 
with perigee is shown in Figure 8 (dashed line). According to our orbital decay 
model, the remaining 29 non-surviving satellites were launched before 1996 and 
include only four civilian satellites (Hubble Space Telescope, BeppoSAX, 
SAMPEX, XTE). Because of the extreme ages of these operational satellites and 
their low initial perigees (500 km - 130 km), they are no doubt being actively 
maintained in orbit against orbital decay. 
A superstorm event would be expected to temporarily increase the atmospheric 
drag for the lower-altitude LEO satellites, thereby reducing their perigees. The 
amount of perigee reduction depends on the details of the upper atmospheric 
storm heating, and could plausibly range from as little as a few kilometers at 
altitudes near 600 km, to perhaps as much as 20 km or more at ISS altitudes of 
350 km. For example, the orbital perigee of the ISS was reduced by 15 
kilometers within a few hours during the Bastille Day storm on July 14, 2001 
[Hammons, 20011. We have examined the impact of such a transient event by 
adding to the LEO baseline model a 60-kilometers orbit decrease in 2012 to all 
surviving satellites below 700 km. There appear to be two components to this 
impact, one prompt and the other delayed. 
Our simple orbit decay model suggests that only a very small number of satellites 
in the existing population (for example Swift, Icesat, Ziyuan 2-3, and Trace) 
would be close enough to the 300-krn threshold in 2012 for imminent re-entry 
following the superstorm. For example, the 1,500-kg Swift satellite was launched 
in 2004 into an orbit with an initial perigee of 600-km on a 2-year mission to study 
gamma-ray bursts. Were it to decay in a manner similar to the SNOE satellite 
[SNOE Team, 20041, Swift could reach an altitude of 380 km by 2012. An 
additional 60-km altitude reduction would place it at 320-km in the regime for 
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rapid re-entry within a few weeks. This essentially accelerates its de-orbit time by 
a full year, similar to the unplanned re-entry of Skylab in 1979. 
Looking farther into the future, however, the superstorm event causes the 
accelerated decay of all satellites below 700 km, and results in a second wave of 
re-entries by 2021 (long after the planned de-orbiting of the ISS) involving 98 
satellites. These satellites were at altitudes above 600-km just before the 
superstorm and should have remained in orbit for several decades. The total 
replacement cost of these satellites is $1.6 x IO”. The most notable members of 
this population are the entire ORBCOMM network, 20 communications satellites, 
the Ikonos, Landsat and SPOT imaging satellites, and research satellites such as 
Terra, Aqua, TIMED and GP-B. The most expensive satellite in jeopardy seems 
to be the $3.1 x 1 09, Helios-2A. Of course, the average age of these systems by 
2021 will be in excess of 20 years so it is plausible to assume that they will be 
retired and replaced long before the model suggests their orbits will decay. Also, 
at the time of the modeled superstorm, the average ages of the satellites will be 
-10 years. Since an unknown number of these satellites have automatic station- 
keeping systems that mitigate against orbit decay, they are still young enough 
that these systems may still have the capacity to obviate the worst effects of such 
a storm, though at a considerable cost to their fuel reserves. 
Although the small number of LEO satellites immediately affected by the storm 
makes this analysis appear reassuring, the greatest practical concern actually 
relates tg the International Space Station. Depending on the details of the 
atmospheric heating from a superstorm, the ISS perigee decay may well be near- 
catastrophic. It is currentty scheduled for retirement sometime after 2014, so it 
’would be operating during our model superstorm year. . 
. The altitude history of the ISS from 1998-2005 [NASA, 20051 in Figure 9 shows 
the periodic ‘saw-tooth’ re-boosts needed to maintain its orbit between 340 - 400 
km. During 2005, the ISS perigee is expected to decline about 90 meters per day 
and requires re-boosts every 10 to 45 days [JSC, 20021. During the 2000 solar 
maximum, the decay rate was much higher: 400 meters per day. Without 
frequent correction, the orbit would decay within about two years. Re-boosts are 
currently provided by either the US Space Shuttle [about 40 km altitude per event 
e.g. Science@NASA, 20001 or by the Russian Progress vehicle [3 km altitude per 
event e.g. SpaceToday.com, 20051. The ISS will eventually have its own 
propulsion system, but there is as yet no firm schedule for its completion. 
Estimates for the maximum perigee change by Messerschmid and Bedrand 
[I 9991 suggest that 40 m/sec is the maximum capacity for the Service Module, 
which translates into approximately 70 kilometers of altitude change at 425 km. If 
a superstorm event should happen to arrive just before the scheduled re-boost in 
201 2 at sunspot maximum, the additional storm-related perturbation combined 
with the anticipated decline in altitude, could easily be outside the capacity of the 
SM or the Space Shuttle. There is also a second hazard that could be 
exacerbated by a large storm event, namely, collisions with prematurely re- 
en te ri ng sa tel I ites . 
. 
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In 2003, the ISS had to be moved to avoid a near-collision with the Italian 
satellite MegSat 0 which, otherwise, would have entered the 4 - 50 km ‘zone of 
avoidance’ surrounding ISS. This, however, was the sixth time such a satellite 
avoidance maneuver had been performed by the ISS. All satellites with orbits just 
above the ISS are carefully watched to avoid such incursions, however, a 
superstorm could easily create a new population of ISS collision threats over the 
course of only a few hours. The ISS orbits within a range of altitudes from 320 
km to 400 km, so likely threats could come from satellites with orbits between 
320 km to 500 km by 2012. In order for a satellite to enter this zone following a 
superstorm event in 2012, it would need to have a perigee in ca 2004 near 600 
km. Only the SciSat-1 , Swift and lcesat satellites launched in 2003-2004 are 
viable candidates. This means that the potential threats to ISS may not have 
been launched by 2004. The shaded entries in Table 8 have estimated re-entries 
within a few years prior to 2012, and may also be possible candidates. However, 
Table 8 also includes an unknown number of satellites that are capable of re- 
boosting, and are therefore not likely to be relevant to such an analysis. 
5.3.2 Radiation Effects 
Although not specifically investigated in the current paper, astronaut radiation 
effects from a superstorm event are also of considerable concern. Recent studies 
by Townsend et a/. [2004, 20051 and Stephens et a/. [2004] have utilized the data 
by McCracken et a/. [2001] to determine the radiation dosages from a Carrington- 
type event, assuming spectral hardnesses similar to the August 1972 SPE. The 
consequences depend rather sensitively on the assumed spectral hardness for 
proton fluences at >30 MeV, however, shielding and radiation dosage 
calculations suggest such superstorm events are likely to be survivable by 
astronauts and spacecraft systems. 
For astronauts and spacecraft in LEO or ISS-type orbits that do not spend 
significant time in the polar regions, spacesuited astronauts (1 gm/cm2 aluminum 
shielding) would receive 1.4 Grays or 140 Rads) which would likely result in 
nausea, malaise and some damage to blood cells. Inside a spacecraft (< 10 
gm/cm2 aluminum shielding) a blood forming organ (BFO) dosage of no more 
than 0.7 Grays (or 70 Rads) would result, with no acute radiation damage. In the 
case of electrical systems, shielding of 0.1 gm/cm2 yields 13.6 kiloRads, while 5 
gm/cm2 yields 0.9 kiloRads. These dosages are well within operational limits for 
most satellite electronics. These limits are substantially exceeded, and near- 
lethality conditions are reached, if the SPE at the estimated strength of the 
Carrington fluence has a spectrum similar to the September 1989 or March 1991 
events, which are predicted to have yielded satellite radiation dosages exceeding 
25 kiloRads according to models by Townsend et a/. [2003]. 
Meanwhile, for interplanetary travel outside the magnetosphere and atmosphere, 
crew radiation dosages assuming a spectral hardness similar to the September 
1989 SPE yield severe radiation effects including in some shielding scenarios, 
even crew fatalities. 
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According to the data assembled by Townsend et a/. [2005], there is only a very 
weak trend to suggest that the hardness of the strongest SPES are correlated 
with their intensity. For this reason, it is not possible to accurately anticipate 
whether a superstorm SPE would be a minor nuisance (soft spectrum) or a 
potentially catastrophic condition (hard spectrum). However, in considering the 
worst-case scenario for safety reasons, it may be prudent to assume that more 
shielding is better than less, and that the risk to humans and satellite electronics 
as presently deployed is worth taking seriously. 
6.0 Superstorm Consequences 
6.1 Favorable Considerations 
Satellites are incredibly hardy. Perhaps the best indication we have to suggest 
our satellite resource is a robust one, is that we have currently experienced 
nearly a dozen major space weather events since 1980, with no widespread loss 
of satellite resources. Satellites appear to have evolved into highly resistant 
systems that seem able to survive the significant storms of the last 20 years, with 
fluences nearly as large as the 1859 Superstorm. The fact that there are at least 
a dozen different satellite designs now in operation may also be a large part of 
the reason why space weather events have not had a more widespread 
damaging effect. 
We have more transponders than are currently in use. Mitigating factors to 
transponder/satellite loss include transponder overcapacity and the vast 
improvements in satellite technology. Currently, there is a nearly 50% 
overcapacity in unused transponders according to Fufron [2003], allowing many 
GEO satellites to operate at undercapacity. 
It is possible to mitigate many SEU effects by using software. Commercial ‘off- 
the-shelf processors that run sophisticated error-detection software have 
demonstrated the potential to reduce SEU events and their impacts to very low 
levels. NASA is exploring new technologies such as the Environmentally 
Adaptive Fault Tolerant Computing System to be flown on the ST-9 spacecraft in 
about 2010, which will detect and eliminate the effects of SEUs. This will reduce 
the need for radiation-hardened processors, and have a significant impact upon 
the reliability of commercial satellite systems during solar storm events. 
There are specific ways to protect satellites from storm damage. Satellites can be 
put in ‘safe’ configurations where solar panels present the smallest cross section 
to the sun. This will inevitably mean a total loss of satellite function for up to 
several days before the event, and at a large economic cost. Even so, the 
October 2003 storm produced many severe satellite problems among systems 
that were presumably ‘safed’ in one way or another but this defensive action did 
not eliminate satellite problems entirely. For example, satellite controllers at 
lnmarsat were able to quickly react to activity to control their fleet of nine 
geosynchronous satellites. According to Webb and Allen [2004], two satellites 
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experienced speed increases in momentum wheels requiring firing of thrusters, 
and one had an outage when its CPU tripped out. 
In time, GPS replacement satellites may become invulnerable to errors. The GPS 
system has rapidly become a major military and economic asset, depended upon 
by millions of military and civilian users. Although the current funding difficulties 
for this system may delay the installation of the GPS Block IIM, IIF and 111 
systems, it seems unlikely for security reasons alone that this system will be 
placed at risk. There are, currently, a dozen backup satellites on the ground, and 
four deactivated as reserves on-orbit. Moreover, they have an impressive history 
of weathering the space environment in the midst of the Van Allen Radiation 
Belts for lifetimes exceeding 10 years in many cases. A Superstorm event may 
not be enough to ‘take down’ this system, but it may produce unprecedented 
ionospheric disturbances and the temporary filling-in of the slot region itself, 
affecting position errors globally. A mitigating factor is that the Block IIF satellites, 
when operational, will have a civilian ‘L5’ channel that has been added to provide 
Total Electron Content (TEC) information directly. In principle, this will be used to 
automatically correct the individual satellite signals for ionospheric disruption. 
The effect of a superstorm event on position errors may be entirely eliminated by 
this means. 
6.2 Unfavorable Consequences 
Even under the best of scenarios, satellite operators will be swamped with 
problems. A survey of satellite engineers and operators by Futmn [2003] finds 
that satellite operators spend 40% of their time working with satellite anomalies. 
Because a single company may have more than one type of satellite in 
operation, and multiple types of spacecraft buses (e.g PanAmSat has five 
different types of satellite buses) the logistics of managing satellite anomalies 
has recently become complicated. Our estimates for a substantial increase, by 
several orders of magnitude, for satellite anomalies all occurring during a 
superstorm would be a major hardship for satellite engineers and operators, and 
may well exceed their abilities to monitor, anticipate and correct severe 
malfunctions before they became fatal to the satellite. The ASCA satellite was 
lost because ISAS could not react fast enough to the changing space weather 
conditions affecting the satellite. The ebb and flow of the storm conditions will 
undoubtedly be very complex in time, forcing operators to experience intense 
periods of activity and intervention. The statistics of the large numbers of SEUs 
seem to demand that multiple, critical conditions (phantom commands, ACS 
upsets etc) may strike a single satellite at nearly the same time. 
It still takes a long time to build a state-of-the-art satellite. The recovery and 
replacement time for satellite systems is not inconsequential, in the event of 
unanticipated, multiple satellite fatalities. For instance, it takes 12-14 months to 
build a Boeing-376 satellite bus according to King [2002], which is one of the 
most popular communications satellite buses now in service. If several dozen 
communications satellites have to be replaced to recover hundreds of failed 
transponders, this could be a significant near-term economic hardship, although 
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if the trends for increasing transponder over-capacity continue, it may simply 
result in a beneficial weeding-out of unused systems. 
It is unlikely that the superstorm impact will be mitigated by a large increase in 
new satellite systems and capacity. The number of satellites launched in 2005- 
2024 will not be a constant rate, but by all forecasts, will increase slightly 
according to COMSTAC [2004]. Through the year 2013, it is expected that the 
annual satellite launches will increase from about 20 to 24, which will represent 
21 1 new GEO satellite systems. Some of those will be for replacement of current, 
on orbit EOL assets. In fact, the demand for new satellites is declining due to the 
launch of more capable, multi-function spacecraft, so that many of the new 
satellite launches between 2004-201 3 may be for replacing EOL satellite 
systems. The estimate we made in Section 3.0 for there being 181 GEO 
satellites older than 10 years by 2004 is similar to the COMSTAC new satellite 
launches of 21 1 by 201 3, suggesting that most of these launches will be to 
replace retired EOL satellites. The 30 'new' sateltites when compared to the 308 
currently operating represent only a 10% net gain in GEO satellite capacity by 
201 3. 
Satellite power continues to increase, as does solar panel voltages. Initially, 
engineers favored 28-50 volt systems, which do not favor the self-propagation of 
arcing events caused by high-energy cosmic rays and SPES. Since 1995, 
satellite voltages have increased to over 100 volts, entering a domain in which 
solar panel arcing is self-propagating . This has caused several satellite systems 
to fail (for example, PAS-6 and Tempo-2 in 1997), forcing them to operate on 
only a fraction of their designed power. The trend towards higher power and 
higher voltage systems continues unabated, making them highly susceptible to 
space weather-generated avalanche failure. 
The Space Station is planned to be abandoned sometime after 2014 just after 
the window for our Superstorm event closes. It may well be that there will be 
astronauts in continuous habitation of space at the time the superstorm arrives. 
7.0 The Status of Warnings and Forecasts 
The National Weather Service portion of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOM) along with the U.S. Air Force currently operates the 
Space Environment Center (SEC). SEC, located in Boulder, Colorado, provides 
real-time monitoring and forecasting of solar and geophysical events, conducts 
research in solar-terrestrial physics, and develops techniques for forecasting 
solar and geophysical disturbances. SEC continually monitors and forecasts near 
Earth space weather and is the Nation's official source for space weather alerts 
and warnings. SEC works with many national and international partners who 
contribute data and observations such as NASA. 
25 
NASA currently maintains a fleet of space science missions in both their prime 
mission phase and their extended mission phase as shown in Table 9. NASA 
extends their missions beyond their prime mission phase into an extended phase 
after they have achieve their original science objectives and only after they have 
demonstrated (every two to three years) that they can continue to contribute to 
other NASA strategic science objectives in a cost effective manner and remain 
relatively healthy. NASA space science missions provide significant amounts of 
data to SEC to support space weather predictions and warnings. 
Advanced warning may be problematical because of the expected retirement of 
nearly all of the current NASA Sun-Earth Connection (SEC) fleet by 2008, and 
the slow launch of replacement systems to provide advanced warning, as 
summarized in Table 9. Although space weather research is an important part of 
NASA’s strategic plan, by 201 0 it is expected that NASA will no longer have 
ACE, SOHO, IMAGE, RHESSI, STEREO, and TRACE as operational space 
weather assets. Severe budget cuts have threatened to nearly eliminate NASA’s 
current space weather research fleet of missions. Assuming no budget cuts or 
programmatic delays, by 2010 NASA will have GEO, SDO, Themis, MMS and 
GEC which will replace many, but not all, of the existing capacities. For example, 
the STEREO satellites are located well off the sun-earth line and would not 
provide in situ field measurements for earth-directed CME’s as ACE currently 
does, though they would allow direct imaging of approaching CMEs. The arrival 
fime of the CME could be calculated but not its geoeffectiveness (Le. determined 
by Bz). 
There will be no years of overlapping coverage during the main mission phases 
(indicated by L or P in the table) of these satellites. Only during the extended (E) 
mission phases will there exist the possibility for overlapping coverage. 
Overlapping coverage is crucial for successful space weather forecasting. For 
example, the ACE satellite to be retired ca 2007 is stationed at L1 and provides 
about l-hour notice of approaching CMEs as well as measures of their magnetic 
field orientation. It is also he case that these satellites will already be 5-9 years 
old by the next sunspot maximum, with the most intense storms likely to arrive 
even later in the cycle. 
So far, NASA satellites have been able to detect CMEs, allowing space weather 
forecasters at NOAA/SEC to estimate their arrival times with reasonable halfday 
accuracy. However, a superstorm CME could take less than 17 hours to reach 
Earth. STEREO and SDO will continue this ability to monitor CMEs during the 
superstorm run-up. However, there will be no way to determine the magnetic field 
orientation of the CME en-route since, presumably, none of the satellites will be 
equipped with in situ magnetometers to study the interplanetary medium. This 
means we will have no advanced warning of the southward orientation of the 
ICME and therefore its geoeffectiveness. 
Magnetic storms can be studied from the ground, however forecasting these 
events remains an illusive goal. According to statistics compiled by Joselyn 
[2001], forecasters can predict that a Kp > 4 storm will occur on a particular day 
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with about 95% accuracy. However, the probabilities decrease to 45% in 
predicting a K > 5 storm. Generally, more storms were detected (206) at a 
specific station (e.g. Fredericksberg) than were predicted (57) so that only 28% 
of the storms are actually predicted 24-hours in advance. Meanwhile, the number 
of false alarms was 62% which can have nearly as severe an economic impact 
as an actual storm, especially for electrical power grid operators subject to 
ground induced currents (GICs). 
For satellites, however, it will not be the ICME or the ensuing geomagnetic storm 
that will provide the greatest immediate problem. X-ray flares and SPEs are the 
most destructive phenomena from the standpoint of satellite operations and 
power. For large events, CMEs are launched at the same time as the flares, so it 
is important to predict the flaring onset event before a halo-type CME is detected. 
The sun produces about 20,000 C-class flares, 2,000 M-class events, 200 X- 
class events and fewer than 100 SPE events per solar cycle according to 
tabulations by Joselyn [2001]. Satellite X-ray and ground-based solar magnetic 
field imagers have provided 24-hour advanced notice on large flares. SPEs, often 
associated with strong X-ray flares, reach earth within hours after the x-ray flare 
is detected. For the most dangerous ‘high rigidity’ SPE spectra with cut-0% 
above 1 GeV, however, the particles are relativistic and arrive at virtually the 
same time as the x-ray burst so the onset of the x-ray flare is already too late an 
event for SPE mitigation to be effective. More research needs to be done to 
identify the solar magnetic fields and particle configurations that lead to flare 
events. Table 10 indicates the current records for X-class flare and SPE 
predictions among the most intense examples to date. 
The most famous, and recent, of these events occurred on November 4,2003. In 
the 5 days prior to the event, the 24-hour X-class flare probabilities [NOAA/SEC, 
20031 were 50%, 40%, 35%, 75%, 75%. On the day of the flare, the probability 
remained at 75%, and in the three days after, dropped to lo%, 1%, and 1%. 
Although the X-ray class had been anticipated, neither the exact luminosity nor 
the day of the event had been predicted. Contrast this with the X-class event on 
April 15, 2001, which was only anticipated at a 25% probability. Including false- 
positives, the best estimate of 24-hour forecast reliability seems to be below 50% 
for X-class flares. This implies a 1 in 2 chance a major X-class ‘superflare’ could 
not be anticipated within 24-hours of the event. 
Would a superflare birth site have a distinctly different magnetic signature in a 
solar active region so that the forecast could be made more accurate? This is 
currently unknown. We do know that the 1859 event coincided with an 
impressively large sunspot group near meridian transit. These are also conditions 
that have been more impressively manifested for lesser storm events. Currently, 
space weather forecasters consider any large sunspot in the 1859-class a 
potential threat for the roughly 2 weeks that it is present on the earthward side of 
the sun, and especially threatening during the 5-days near solar meridian transit. 
Currently, this may well be the best advanced warning we can achieve. 
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8.0 Conclusion 
All indications point to a potentially major economic and military impact of our 
space assets for the next major 1859-like superstorm event. Unlike previous 
historical events, our current reliance on satellite technology and human activities 
in space, place us in a unique and unprecedented nexus of vulnerabilities from 
such an event. 
Although it is difficult to accurately assess the economic consequences due to 
incomplete data on military and commercial satellite systems, we can 
nevertheless bound the likely impacts by a worst-case scenario involving a 
superstorm about 3-fold more severe than the 1859 Carrington-Hodgson event. 
This scenario includes a $5 to 10 x I O9 financial impact on commercial satellite 
systems due to a combination of direct hardware loss, service loss and indirect 
profit loss. Satellite engineers and operators will experience thousands of 
satellite anomalies per day across the satellite fleet- an unprecedented rate 
never-before experienced during the space age. There may be a significant loss 
of operating satellites numbering perhaps 50 - 80 as a result of older systems 
already past their designed lifetime radiation dosages, being impacted by a large 
new influx of radiation equal to 3 to 5 more years of annual dosage. The SPES 
from the superstorm result in a sharp rise in mission-critical anomalies in satellite 
power and orientation systems, which lead to complete satellite failure, especially 
for GEO and ME0 satellites that are not as atmospherically well shielded as LEO 
systems. For satellites younger than about 5 years, the superstorm may actually 
double their accumulated dosages to date, and halve their operating lifetimes. 
Current GPS systems will be rendered temporarily, or perhaps even 
permanently, unusable with, at the minimum, very large position errors perhaps 
approaching 100-meters being common for 24-72 hours. Unless the new 
generation Block IIM systems are in place, which are able to compensate for 
ionospheric TEC variations, the GPS system may effectively go off-line for many 
civilian and military applications. There is also the possibility that a number of the 
older GPS satellites may fail so that the full compliment of 24 satellites will be 
unavailable in the months and years immediately following the storm. This means 
that even ionosphere-compensated position measurements may not be available 
for portions of the day when the requisite four to six satellites are not above the 
horizon for specific geographic locations. The realization of the expected position 
errors for military use with a minimum of four satellites above the horizon, will be 
a complex function of local time and geographic location requiring a detailed 
ephemeris to implement. It may take months or years to restore the GPS system 
to full operating status, depending on the number of satellite failures involved. 
The International Space Station, will undoubtedly experience a significant loss in 
altitude exceeding the 15 km decrease experienced during the Bastille-Day 
Storm. Existing re-boost systems can produce a maximum of only about 70 km of 
perigee change. If the superstorm occurs at the peak of the next sunspot 
maximum when re-boosts are more frequent and larger in magnitude, the 
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required post-superstorm reboost may be at the limits of what can be 
accomplished during a single mission. The specific details depend on the amount 
of atmospheric heating and the duration of the superstorm event. There may also 
be an increased risk of collision by the ISS with in-bound satellites affected by 
the temporarily increased atmospheric drag. Approximately 22 operating LEO 
satellites are currently in orbits that could be severely affected by superstorm 
atmospheric heating and highdrag conditions, and which could reach or pass 
through the ISS altitude range on de-orbit tra’ectories. Moreover, an additional 98 
LEO satellites, worth an estimated $1.6 x 10 , may prematurely re-enter by 
2021. Although many of these systems will doubtless have been replaced, 
thereby minimizing the economic and scientific impacts, there re-entry at this 
time will have been unplanned and premature by several decades at the normal 
rates of orbit decay. 
Our resources for forecasting such a superstorm using NASA and N O M  assets 
will be covered by a complicated constellation of satellites whose overlapping 
years will be generally well-beyond their planned mission lifetimes. These 
satellites will be relatively old systems near the end of their maximum lifespans. 
Unlike the coverage we have experienced during Cycle-23, the next sunspot 
cycle will be significantly more problematical. 
Our forecasting methodologies today must significantly improve, or the pre- 
conditions for a superstorm may actually be missed. There is currently a better 
than 50/50 chance that the X-ray and SPE events associated with a superstorm 
may not be anticipated in time to allow satellite operators to mitigate their worst 
impacts. Forecasts of the level of the geomagnetic effects, and the severity of the 
storm, may also lack certainty in the 24-hours leading up to the storm. The event 
may, however, be preceded by several days of false-positive forecasts, which 
may have the undesirable effect of rendering satellite engineers and operators 
less engaged when the actual event arrives. 
If the events of the 1859 superstorm serve as a guide, the scope of the storm will 
most certainly be an awesome event in our modern history, but one that the vast 
majority of our satellite resources may reasonably be expected to survive. 
Nevertheless, there will be a considerable number of satellite systems that will be 
inevitably damaged, or seriously degraded in operating lifetime and profitability. 
l o  
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Table 1 - Statistics for Working Satellites ca 2004. 
Location Corn Military Research Total 
Sats operating 
Satel I i tes 
I LEO- I273 I94 170 
GEO 
I437 I 
1 
308 51 8 367 
I ME0 119 I101 I12 
Satellite 
I132 I 
Bandwidth Rental Rate Usage 
I N SAT-2 E 36,72 MHz 
I Totals I600 I245 I91 
$1.5 INTELSAT lease to customers 
I936 
Telstar-5 
SatMex-5 
54 MHz $3.1 Auctioned at $255,00O/mo 
36 MHz $2.3 Auctioned at $195,0001mo 
Sky net I 36 MHz I $1.4 1 Average for 7 existing satellites in 2002. 
SBS-6 I36MHz I $3.1 I Ku-band leased for $350/hr 
Telstar-5 I Auctioned at $175,00O/mo 
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Table 3: SPE fluences in pfus for 1976 - 2004 
(Year I Peak I Date I X-flare I 
1976 12 pfu May 1 x2 
1977 200 Sep 79 x2 
1978 
~ 
1997 490 Nov7 x9 
1998 1700 ADril21 M1 
31700 Nov6 
2002 2520 ADril21 
2003 I 29500 i oCt 29 i X17 
2004 I 2086 I July26 I M1 
Table 4: Operational status of oldest GEO satellites by 2005 
Satellite Transponders Status 
Mansat-3 
Farrah-5 
SBS4 
DSCS 3A2 
I DSCS3A3 1 1 9 1 3 1  [ 7 I Operating-Military 
28 11 2 Operating. 
20 29 ??? Unknown 
20 29 14 Operating 
19 31 7 Operating-Military 
I DSCS3B5 7 I Operating-Military 
Optus-AJ 
Spacenet-3 
TDRS-3 
Marecs-3 
I Brasilsat-A2 I 18 I 33 I 30 I Replaced 2000 
17 35 15 Operating 
16 35 28 Replaced 1996 
16 37 48 Operating 
16 37 ??? Unknown 
TDRS-4 
FLTSATCOMSC 
DSP 3-2 
I DSCS 2-15 I 15 1 39 I ??? I Operating-Military 
15 39 48 Operating 
15 39 12 Operating-Military 
14 49 ??? Operating- Military 
I 1ntelsat602 1 1 5 1  39 I 6 4  I Operating. 
Asiasat-1 
DSP 3-3 
I Marecs4 I 15 I 39 I ??? I Unknown 
14 49 24 Replaced 1999 
14 49 ??? Operating-Military 
Intelsat-604 
Palapa B2R 
SBS-6 
Skynet 4A 
14 49 38 Replaced in 2002 
14 49 30 Operating 
14 49 14 Operating 
14 49 7 Operating-Military 
Inmarsat-2Fl 1 1 4 1  49 I 8 I Operating 
I Skynet4C 1 1 4 1  49 I 7 I Operating-Military 
I ~easat-5 I 14 I 49% I 13 I Operating-Military 
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Table 5 Major Historical Storm Rankings 
Date CME SPE Dst SID 
Nov4,2003 I I I I 115 
Aug 4,1972 14.6 5.0 
Oct 28,2003 20.3 
Feb 11,1958 -428 
Feb 4,1872 
I Mar 14,1989 I 
Latitude 
(degrees) 
I 
I 
> X17 
l9 I 
Table 6: SPE events and their correlation with the sunspot maximum 
SPE Year . I Fluence I Sunspot Max 1 (SPE-Max) 
Aug 12,1989 9,200 pfu 1989.6 0.0 yrs 
Oct 19, 1989 40,000 1989.6 +o. 2 
I .~ 
Mar 23, 1991' I 43,000 I 1989.6 I +1.3 
Feb20,1994 I 10,000 I 1989.6 I +4.6 
July 14, 2000 I 24,000 I 2000.5 I +0.1 
Nov8, 2000 I 14,800 I 2000.5 I +0.3 
Sept 24, 2001 I 12,900 I 2000.5 I +1.3 
Nov4, 2001 I 31,700 I 2000.5 I +1.4 
Nov22,2001 I 18,900 I 2000.5 I +IS 
Oct 28, 2003 I 29,500 I 2000.5 I +3.3 
Table 7: Fitted orbit decay constants 
Satellite 1 Mass 1 Perigee I Solar Maximum 1 Solar Minimum 
I ss I 470,000 I 395 I 1.0 1 0.6 I 1.1 1 0.4 
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Table 8: Possible ISS orbit-crossing candidates. 
at Predicted 
Satellite Launch launch Re-entry 
Perigee 
fkm) Year 
SwiR 2004 '600' 201 3 
N 2 - 3  (Z'Y-2C) 2004 472 201 1 
2003 518 
. 2Qo3 500 
OrbVieW-3 2003 470 2010 
Cosmos 2405 2004 402 2010 
ZY 2-2 2002 472 2009 
RHESSl 2002 520 2008 
GRACE-2 2001 500 2008 
KORONAS-F 2001 !XI0 2008 
GRACE-1 2001 483 2008 
QUICKBIRD-2 2001 460 2008 
ofeq-5 2002 370 2008 
ZY 2-1 
Cosmos-2383 
Sicral 1 
Cute-l 
Rocsat-1 
Ziyuan-2 
EROS-A1 
CHAMP 
FSW 3-3 
Mikron 
CORIOLIS 
TRACE 
NROL-1 
2000 472 
2001 402 
2001 328 
2003 320 
1999 600 
1999 483 
2000 480 
2000 400 
2004 284 
2004 282 
2003 278 
2004 260 
1998 602 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2007 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2006 
2005 
Table 9 - Current and Future Sun-Earth Missions 
SHO WND POL ACE TRA IMG TIM HES STE TWN THM Sol6 MMS SDO GEC GOES 
Note: HES=RHESSI, TRA=TRACE, TWN=TWINS, IMG=IMAGE, POL=Polar, 
TIM=TIMED, SHO=SOHO, STE=STEREO, THM=THEMIS and WND=WIND. Launch 
years for the GOES-series are indicated by M, N, 0, P and R respectively. L=Launch 
year, P=planned (budgeted) mission year, and E=extended mission year subject to 
NASA approval. The shaded zones correspond to sunspot maximum conditions between 
1999-2001 and expected to be 201 1-2013. 
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11-2t0 11-41 75% 
probability in next 
24- h 
Table 10 Some recent X-Class Flare Predictions 
11-4-2003 
Date Predicted 
10-26 to 10-31 50% 
prob. In next 24hrs. 
Date of 
Actual Event 
10-28-2003 
4-9 to 4-1 4 25% in 
next 24-hrs 
4-1 5-2001 
4-2: 35% chance in 
next 48 hours 
4-2-2001 
Predicted 
Strength 
X-class 
X-class 
X-class 
X-class 
Actual 
Strength 
X20+ 
X I  7 
X I  4 
X20 
Reference: www.spaceweather.com and NOAA/SEC 
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180 I 1 
Satellite Age (Years) 
Figure 1 : Cumulative value of the GEO satellites with ages less than 20 years by 
2004. Th.e total value (dots) is a combination of the replacement cost, 
including launch, of the satellite (diamonds), and the revenue generated 
from 'fie-satellite transponders in service (squares). 
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Figure 2: SOHO satellite operating power (blue solid line) compared to a model 
(dashed line), including cosmic ray and SPE degradation. SOHO data 
adapted from Brekke [2005]. 
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Figure 3: Cumulative GEO satellite population size compared to operating power 
for 2004 (blue diamond points) and 2012 (black square points). 
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Figure 4: Cumulative GEO satellite ages for 2004 (blue diamond points) and 
2012 (black square points). 
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Figure 5: Satellite de-orbits (blue solid line) compared with solar activity cycles 
from 1967-2004 (black dashed line). 
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Figure 6: Distribution of replacement costs for GEO satellites assuming a 15-year 
lifetime. 
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Figure 7: Comparison of SNOE satellite decay altitude profile, with a simple 
power-law model. Satellites with perigees below 300 km de-orbit within 1- 
year. A precise orbit evolution is not needed for the current analysis, which 
involves a 100-km binning resolution. 
1 80 
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Figure 8: Distribution of LEO satellite orbits by 2004 (blue solid line) and 
predicted 201 3 (black dashed line) with 100-km perigee binning. 
Variations in the >1200 km bins are spurious, and caused by I-km shift in 
modeled satellite perigees across binning boundary. 
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Figure 9: International Space Station altitude evolution between 1999-2005 
adapted from NASA [2005]. Orbit decay rates are -400 meterslday at 
solar maximum and -90 meterdday near solar minimum. 
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